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Platform Neutrality: Enhancing 
Freedom of Expression in Spheres 
of Private Power
Frank Pasquale*
Troubling patterns of suppressed speech have emerged on the corporate 
internet. A large platform may marginalize (or entirely block) potential 
connections between audiences and speakers. Consumer protection 
concerns arise, for platforms may be marketing themselves as open, 
comprehensive, and unbiased, when they are in fact closed, partial, 
and self-serving. Responding to protests, the accused platform either 
asserts a right to craft the information environment it desires, or 
abjures responsibility, claiming to merely reflect the desires and 
preferences of its user base. Such responses betray an opportunistic 
commercialism at odds with the platforms’ touted social missions. 
Large platforms should be developing (and holding themselves to) 
more ambitious standards for promoting expression online, rather 
than warring against privacy, competition, and consumer protection 
laws. These regulations enable a more vibrant public sphere. They 
also defuse the twin specters of monopolization and total surveillance, 
which are grave threats to freedom of expression.
IntroductIon
Are powerful internet companies censoring speech? From activists angry 
at Apple to protesters snubbed by Twitter, confrontations are taking on a 
familiar pattern. A large platform marginalizes (or entirely blocks) potential 
connections between speakers and audiences. Responding to protests, the 
company either asserts its own right to craft the information environment it 
desires, or abjures responsibility, claiming to merely reflect the desires and 
preferences of its user base. 
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Those who feel censored appeal to legislators, judges, or the court of public 
opinion. Some claim that they have been denied due process. Others decry 
monopolization. There are claims of discrimination, or subtle bias, hidden 
in complex software that is rarely (if ever) analyzed by entities independent 
of the companies that run it.1 Consumer protection concerns also arise, for 
platforms may be marketing themselves as open, comprehensive, and unbiased, 
when they are in fact closed, partial, and self-serving.2
To defend themselves, some platforms deploy constitutional arguments 
against regulation of what they say, which constitutes most of what the 
firms do. Legal scholars have, in turn, formulated more general theories of 
corporate speech in industries dependent on models, algorithms, and largely 
automated arrangements of information.3 These projects are important and 
deserve attention from legislators, judges, and regulators. But the pressure to 
analogize current technologies to past ones in order to apply precedent can 
occlude the degree to which some new media are fundamentally, qualitatively 
distinct from past ones. Therefore, theories of the social and political aspects 
of internet platforms in an era of surveillance capitalism should inform both 
communications and legal scholarship.4 Social theory is an especially important 
aspect of theoretical inquiry in law when, as Julie Cohen notes elsewhere in 
this volume, extant regulatory models appear increasingly outdated.5
Social theory can also guide regulators as they resolve (or render irrelevant) a 
basic tension that has vexed communications law: whether internet platforms are 
better characterized as enablers of communication (conduits), or as embodying 
content itself. In the United States, judicial sympathy toward the idea of 
corporate rights has led to decisions affirming for-profit platforms’ selection 
and arrangement of information as not merely copyrightable, but also a form 
1 On the secrecy of the underlying code and much data, see Frank Pasquale, The 
Black Box socieTy (2015).
2 Scholars were warning about this problem for years before it became a major 
public concern. See, e.g., Lucas Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: 
Why the Politics of Search Engines Matters, 16 inFo. soc’y 169 (2000).
3 See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Free Speech, 100 iowa l. rev. 501 
(2015); Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41 hasTings consT. l.q. 235 (2014); 
Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First 
Amendment, 76 geo. wash. l. rev. 986 (2008); Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech 
and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated Experience, 78 geo. wash. 
l. rev. 697 (2010).
4 Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an 
Information Civilization, 30 J. inFo. Tech. 75 (2015).
5 Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 TheoreTical 
inquiries l. 369 (2016).
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of free speech.6 In Europe, free expression rights have been better cabined 
to speech by individual human beings, rather than “corporate persons” or 
software.7 
This basic divergence in values helps explain a number of policy differences 
between the United States and the European Union, in areas ranging from 
privacy to antitrust to industrial policy. The U.S. approach is at its core 
neoliberal, premised on accelerating capital acquisition by asymmetrically 
disabling some forms of state power (such as consumer protection) and 
entrenching others (such as the protection of corporate trade secrets). As 
befits a more mixed economy, the EU approach is nuanced and variegated. 
But neither rests on a broader normative theory of what a well-ordered digital 
sphere of freedom of expression would look like.
This Article aims to clear some ground to enable the development of such a 
theory, by examining the relationship between free expression and regulation 
on the internet. Many attorneys believe there is a tension between regulation 
and free expression. But in fact, when antitrust or competition law, consumer 
protection regulation, and privacy protections apply to very large internet 
platforms, they are as apt to promote freedom of expression as to limit it. 
Such laws are critical tools to ensure “platform neutrality,” a principle whose 
flexibility matches the protean nature of today’s online environment. The 
core idea of neutrality is to prevent massive intermediaries from distorting 
either private commerce or the public sphere simply by virtue of their size, 
network power, or surveillance capacities. As the French Conseil National du 
Numerique has observed, “[t]he goals behind the neutrality principle should 
. . . be factored into the development of digital platforms: while extremely 
useful and innovative, their growth must not be allowed to hamper the use of 
Internet as a forum for creation, free expression and the exchange of ideas.”8 
6 See, e.g., Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 2014 WL 1282730, at *6 (SDNY 2014) 
(“[A]llowing Plaintiffs to sue Baidu for what are in essence editorial judgments 
about which political ideas to promote would run afoul of the First Amendment.”). 
7 See, e.g., Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Españiola 
de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González, 2014 EUR-Lex 62012CJ013 
(May 13, 2014), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELE
X:62012CJ0131&from=EN; Frank Pasquale, Reforming the Law of Reputation, 
47 loy. u. chi. l.J. 515 (2015) (discussing the implications of the right to be 
forgotten in particular and the policies behind Europe’s General Data Protection 
Regulation in general). 
8 conseil naTional numerique, PlaTForm neuTraliTy: Building an oPen and 
susTainaBle digiTal environmenT (2014), http://www.cnnumerique.fr/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/PlatformNeutrality_VA.pdf; Axelle Lemair, Which 
Digital Strategy for France and Europe in an Age of Disruption?, Lecture at 
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In the wake of recent accusations of news suppression at Facebook, even U.S. 
conservatives appear open to some version of these values.9 
It is wrong to treat massive internet intermediaries as vulnerable media 
always in danger of being suborned by the state, as Part I shows. Viewing 
intermediaries as digital utilities opens up new opportunities for regulation 
in the public interest, as Part II shows. This regulation may crimp the “free 
expression” of “corporate persons,” but is necessary for fair opportunities 
at expression (or even understanding of the social world) by human persons 
generally. The Article concludes with reflections on how platform neutrality 
can inform future regulatory initiatives directed toward new media.
I. content or conduIt: IntermedIarIes’  
convenIent IdentIty crIsIs
Telecommunications infrastructure has enabled enormous advances in 
expression.10 The critical free expression at stake in governmental regulation of 
such services is that of their users, rather than that of the platforms themselves.11 
This emphasis prevents carriers from, say, deploying opportunistic assertions of 
free expression protections to justify denials of service to businesses and persons 
of whom they disapprove. It also helps immunize carriers from responsibility 
for what customers say while using their services.12 The phone company can 
the London School of Economics Public Event, London, U.K. (Mar. 20, 2015), 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/events/2015/03/20150320t1800vWT.aspx.
9 Michael Nunez, Senate GOP Launches Inquiry into Facebook’s News Curation, 
gizmodo (May 10, 2016), http://gizmodo.com/senate-gop-launches-inquiry-into-
facebook-s-news-curati-1775767018 (based on news reports that Facebook news 
curators systematically suppressed conservative news). This situation belied a 
common defense of unfettered corporate speech rights in the online context — 
namely, that the algorithms personalizing feeds are too complex for outsiders to 
assess. For further critiques of that idea, see Frank Pasquale, Bittersweet Mysteries 
of Machine Learning, london sch. oF econ. media Pol’y Blog (Feb. 3, 2016), 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2016/02/05/bittersweet-mysteries-of-
machine-learning-a-provocation/. 
10 Jack Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 n.y.u. l. rev. 1 (2004).
11 Nicholas Bramble, Ill Telecommunications: How Internet Infrastructure Providers 
Lose First Amendment Protection, 17 mich. Telecomm. & Tech. l. rev. 67 
(2010); Christopher Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 s. cal. l. 
rev. 669 (2005). 
12 Tim Wu, Has AT&T Lost Its Mind, slaTe mag. (Jan. 16, 2008), http://www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2008/01/has_att_lost_its_mind.html.
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be forced by government to extend service to the home of someone likely to 
defame others; but even if that person uses the phone to make defamatory 
comments, those harmed cannot try to hold the carrier responsible.13 It is a 
common carrier, under Title II of the Federal Communications Act,14 and 
must take all comers who can pay reasonable, nondiscriminatory fees. 
The same delicate balance persisted, albeit in a diluted form, in the case 
of cable networks. When challenging must-carry rules on First Amendment 
grounds in the United States,15 they had a better case than the phone companies. 
One can, in principle, imagine a cable carrier with a very specific ideology 
and aspiration to express it via selection of channels. Nevertheless, in Turner 
v. FCC, the Supreme Court held that must-carry rules could apply to cable 
networks as well.16 
Indeed, courts have permitted certain forms of government regulation 
of the press even for entities that clearly produced content, such as radio 
stations, or broadcasters (which may only be one of hundreds of channels 
provided by a cable carrier). The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
imposed “equal time” regulations on broadcasters, and the Supreme Court 
unanimously affirmed the regulation as constitutional.17 However, for other 
media, government intervention was more limited. For instance, in Miami 
Herald v. Tornillo, a state “right of reply” statute (giving those criticized in a 
newspaper a chance to have their own replies printed in the same newspaper) 
was rejected by the Court as a violation of the First Amendment.18 
There may seem to be a conflict between Miami Herald’s affordance of 
very strong First Amendment protection to a newspaper, and Red Lion’s 
13 Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 202 (2012). 
14 Id. § 201.
15 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); see also Turner Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
16 Turner, 520 U.S. at 185. Carrying three mandatory channels was a small burden to 
a cable company, and the burden was outweighed by the furthering of government 
interests in “(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast 
television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a 
multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for 
television programming.” Id. at 189-90.
17 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1967). For more on the legacy of 
Red Lion, see dawn nunziaTo, virTual Freedom: neT neuTraliTy and Free 
sPeech in The inTerneT age (2009). 
18 Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (“It has yet to be demonstrated 
how governmental regulation of this crucial [editorial] process can be exercised 
consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved 
to this time.”). 
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affirmation of regulation of radio stations.19 In Red Lion, the U.S. Supreme 
Court unanimously affirmed the FCC’s decision to require broadcasters to 
grant political candidates they criticized some “right of reply.” This “fairness 
doctrine” was meant to assure that the power of broadcasters would be 
exercised in the public interest, rather than simply reflect the political views 
of their owners. The Court permitted this regulation of the airwaves in Red 
Lion, by reasoning that broadcasters deserve less protection because of the 
scarcity of channels, and a history of governmental regulation in the area. 
Of course, the “history of regulation” rationale begs the question of why the 
FCC was allowed to regulate the airwaves in the first place. A more plausible 
approach focuses on the pervasiveness and scarcity of the media involved. 
Newspapers generally were delivered only to paid subscribers, and anyone 
(with enough money) could start one.20 Television and radio stations broadcast 
indiscriminately (within their range), and had to be licensed by the FCC.
Internet access has raised new questions for both the Supreme Court and 
regulators. In the 1997 case Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,21 the 
Supreme Court struck down anti-indecency elements of the Communications 
Decency Act (CDA),22 aimed at the regulation of pornography. Though the 
Court had upheld anti-indecency regulation in prior cases involving broadcast 
networks, it found the CDA’s provisions too broadly drawn.23 More importantly 
for our purposes, it characterized the Internet as a medium far less invasive 
and more open than radio or broadcast media: 
[W]e [have] observed that “[e]ach medium of expression . . . may 
present its own problems.” Thus, some of our cases have recognized 
special justifications for regulation of the broadcast media that are not 
applicable to other speakers. . . . In these cases, the Court relied on the 
history of extensive Government regulation of the broadcast medium, 
. . . the scarcity of available frequencies at its inception . . . and its 
“invasive” nature. . . .
19 See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, The Möbius Strip of the First Amendment: 
Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 s.c. l. rev. 539, 544 (1978). 
20 Jerome Barron, Access Reconsidered, 76 geo. wash. l. Rev. 826 (2008); see 
also yochai Benkler, The wealTh oF neTworks: how social ProducTion 
TransForms markeTs and Freedom (2006) (on the cost of printing press, etc.).
21 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
22 Communications Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (1996) 
(codified as amended at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
23 The CDA had prohibited “the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent 
messages to any recipient under 18 years of age.” Reno, 521 U.S. at 859 (citing 
47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994 ed., Supp. II)). 
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Those factors are not present in cyberspace. Neither before nor 
after the enactment of the CDA have the vast democratic forums of 
the Internet been subject to the type of government supervision and 
regulation that has attended the broadcast industry. Moreover, the 
Internet is not as “invasive” as radio or television.24
Even at the time Reno was decided, Justices O’Connor and Rehnquist worried 
about its continuing relevance. In a separate opinion (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), they urged Congress to consider future lawmaking premised 
on new technological development that could more effectively “zone” parts 
of the internet for children only.25
Fortunately, the Reno case can be read as only applying to regulation 
targeting the internet as a whole, and not necessarily as an all-purpose quashing 
of any effort to qualify the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be 
applied to important firms or sectors within the internet. The internet in general 
may “provide relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of 
all kinds,”26 but the dominant search engines and social networks within it 
meticulously exercise control over search results and newsfeeds. Moreover, 
the Reno case even appears dated in the context of broadband internet access. 
In the early 2000s, the FCC voted to largely deregulate internet services, 
reasoning that a relatively competitive market in access would discipline 
carriers and give users ample opportunities to switch to congenial networks.27 
But by 2012, a decade of evidence demonstrated the opposite: both fixed 
and mobile broadband services were subject to significant concentration and 
indifference to important consumer and public concerns.28
24 Id. at 868-69.
25 A similar concern arises today in the context of French authorities’ efforts to apply 
the “right to be forgotten” to Google sites accessed in France (such as Google.
com), rather than simply to the site operated by Google’s French subsidiary 
(Google.fr). Google characterizes the efforts as a form of censorship that would 
allow one country to dictate to the world its views on the permissibility of 
publishing certain links in response to certain name-based queries. However, 
geo-blocking could address the issue by applying the decision to sites accessed 
in France, rather than simply applying it to Google.fr (a “remedy” that simply 
invites widespread usage of the Google.com site). See Julia Powles, Right to 
Be Forgotten: Swiss Cheese Internet, or Database of Ruin?, guardian, Aug. 
1, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/01/right-to-be-
forgotten-google-swiss-cheese-internet-database-of-ruin.
26 Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
27 Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
28 susan crawFord, caPTive audience: The Telecom indusTry and monoPoly 
Power in The new gilded age (2012).
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Reno was a double victory for internet firms. While striking down the 
anti-indecency provisions of the CDA, the Court let stand its Section 230, 
a veritable Magna Carta of corporate impunity with respect to causes of 
action like defamation, privacy violations, and business torts.29 The year after 
the CDA passed, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 199830 
afforded immunities to intermediaries for intellectual property infringement 
enabled by their networks. As long as they operated “notice and takedown” 
procedures to respond to complaints of intellectual property infringement via 
uploads or links provided by their sites, they could avoid liability.31 
Not all countries have laws like the CDA and DMCA.32 Nevertheless, in 
the many forums that have tried to call Google, Facebook, Amazon, and other 
firms to account, a fundamentally American-exceptionalist legal logic based 
on the two laws has informed these leading internet intermediaries’ efforts to 
deflect liability. When intellectual property or defamation claims arise, they 
emphasize their role as mere conduits, reflecting the preferences and serving 
the interests of users. But when classic business tort or privacy claims arise, 
intermediaries argue that they are speakers, their selection and arrangement 
of information a type of activity best protected as freedom of expression.33 
Thus, Google has shifted its self-characterization as content-provider or 
conduit opportunistically.34 For example, due to a number of anti-Semites’ 
29 Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 wash. 
l. rev. 335, 364 (2005); Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of 
Intermediary Immunity, 87 noTre dame l. rev. 293 (2011).
30 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
31 Corey Omer, Intermediary Liability for Harmful Speech: Lessons from Abroad, 
28 harv. J.l. & Tech. 290 (2014).
32 Id. For example, many countries require search engines to take down links that 
they would be under no obligation to remove in the United States. Pasquale, 
supra note 1, at 198 (“Germany, Argentina, and Japan, for example, have all 
required Google to alter certain search results that defame individuals or mislead 
users.”). However, trade agreements now being negotiated may end up further 
internationalizing policies of immunity and impunity for intermediaries. 
33 See Tansy Woan, Searching for an Answer: Can Google Legally Manipulate 
Search Engine Results?, 16 u. Pa. J. Bus. l. 294 (2013); Tim Wu, Machine 
Speech, 161 u. Pa. l. rev. 1495 (2013).
34 Noam Cohen, Professor Makes the Case That Google Is a Publisher, n.y. 
Times, May 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/21/business/media/
eugene-volokh-ucla-professor-makes-a-case-for-google-as-publisher.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.html (“Is Google search an intermediary like the 
phone company — simply connecting people with the information they seek? 
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efforts to manipulate search rankings, a Holocaust denial site routinely appeared 
in the top ten results for the query “Jew.”35 In response to complaints from the 
Anti-Defamation League, Google added a headline titled, “An explanation of 
our search results” to the top of the page.36 The linked webpage explained the 
reasons why the anti-Semitic site appeared so high in the relevant rankings 
and distanced Google from the results.37 During this controversy, and in many 
subsequent instances, Google presented itself as little more than a cultural voting 
booth, a transmitter of popular preference as processed through algorithms 
with no obligation to reflect social values. Just as the U.S. Supreme Court 
has frequently protected repulsive and offensive speech as the “price” of a 
neutrally, objectively applied First Amendment, Google claimed that it must 
accept that an anti-Semitic site could rise to the top of search results on the 
basis of neutral signals used to rank sites generally. But in many other disputes, 
Google claims an absolute right to knock any site off any search result page it 
generates.38 That is the natural, if ironic, logic of its “free speech” case against 
antitrust liability for favoring its own services and demoting competitors in 
search results.39 Note that such a “free expression” rationale would not simply 
Or is Google search a publisher, like a newspaper, which provides only the 
information that it sees fit and is protected by the First Amendment?”).
35 The site, Jew waTch, http://www.jewwatch.com/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2016), 
is an obvious hate site. For further discussion, see Jonathan Zittrain, Love the 
Processor, Hate the Process, Harv. Law Sch. Chair Lecture, Cambridge, Mass. 
(Apr. 2, 2015), https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/2015/04/Zittrain. 
36 See Google Search Ranking of Hate Sites Not Intentional, anTi-deFamaTion 
league, http://www.adl.org/rumors/google_search_rumors.asp (last updated 
Apr. 22, 2004): 
The ranking of Jewwatch and other hate sites is in no way due to a conscious 
choice by Google, but solely is a result of this automated system of ranking. 
. . . The longevity of ownership, the way articles are posted to it, the links to 
and from the site, and the structure of the site itself all increase the ranking 
of [the anti-Semitic site] within the Google formula.
37 Google Responds to ADL: Google Explains Its Search Results, anTi-deFamaTion 
league, http://archive.adl.org/internet/google_explanation.html (last visited Feb. 
1, 2016): 
If you recently used Google to search for the word “Jew,” you may have seen 
results that were very disturbing. We assure you that the views expressed by 
the sites in your results are not in any way endorsed by Google. We’d like 
to explain why you’re seeing these results when you conduct this search. 
38 Eugene Volokh & Donald Falk, First Amendment Protection for Search Engine 
Search Results, 8 J.l. econ. & Pol’y 883 (2012); see also Woan, supra note 
33, at 316-24.
39 Volokh & Falk, supra note 38.
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allow Google to decide, say, how to present results for political candidates or 
culturally sensitive issues.40 Rather, its extraordinary over-inclusiveness would 
also privilege the firm’s ability to hide results leading to startups founded by 
its ex-employees, or rival firms. 
Large technology platforms’ strategic, opportunistic, and contradictory 
self-characterizations take advantage of the siloed nature of legal disputes. 
Specialization obscures the big picture as individual disputes come to judges 
and regulators prepackaged as “free expression,” “intellectual property,” 
or “privacy” disputes. Cyberlaw scholars can unintentionally contribute 
to the extraordinary power of internet firms by adopting a similar logic of 
specialization, and losing sight of the larger picture. Google, for instance, 
has won key cases in copyright, trademark, and antitrust; key immunities 
in the context of free expression defenses; and has avoided classification as 
a “consumer reporting agency” under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.41 Any 
particular outcome may well have been advisable as a matter of law and/or 
policy, considered alone. But what happens when a critical mass of close cases 
combines with network effects to give a few firms extraordinary power over 
our information about (and even interpretation of) events? A legal system 
incapable of answering (or even contemplating) such a question has little 
chance of constructively channeling the development of new technologies.42 
These opportunistic shifts in self-characterization have also made U.S. 
internet intermediary law a major barrier to accountability online, and threaten 
40 These decisions could be very important. Robert Epstein, How Google Could 
Rig the 2016 Election, PoliTico, Aug. 19, 2015, at http://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2015/08/how-google-could-rig-the-2016-election-121548 
(popularizing Epstein’s past, peer-reviewed research on the persuasive impact 
of undetectable biases in search engines that are either mandated by managers, 
coded by engineers, or arise in an emergent fashion from the interplay of user 
data and algorithmic ordering of information).
41 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.
com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (copyright); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 
474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007) (First Amendment); Eric Goldman, Google 
Defeats Trademark Challenge to Its AdWords Service, ForBes, Oct. 22, 2012, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/10/22/google-defeats-trademark-
challenge-to-its-adwords-service/#218564e1270d (summarizing trademark cases); 
Claire Cain Miller & Mark Scott, Google Settles Its European Antitrust Case: 
Critics Remain, n.y. Times, Feb. 5, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/
technology/google-reaches-tentative-antitrust-settlement-with-european-union.
html. 
42 For a general account of the problem of channeling technology through law, 
see laurence TriBe, channeling Tech Through law (1973). 
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to put intermediaries above the law globally in an era of domestic-law-
displacing trade agreements.43 Following recent work connecting the transfer 
pricing of intellectual property (where firms have incentives to minimize the 
value of their IP) to damages claims in IP litigation (where the incentives are 
to maximize valuation),44 policymakers could refuse to allow intermediaries 
to have it both ways, forcing them to assume the rights and responsibilities 
of content-provider or conduit. Such a development would be fairer than 
current trends, which allow many intermediaries to enjoy the rights of each 
and responsibilities of neither. 
II. How regulatIon can Promote sPeecH onlIne
Online platforms often characterize their own selection and arrangement of 
materials, and assistance in helping others’ search for materials of interest, as 
a form of speech. However tempting the metaphor of “search as speech” may 
be, courts must avoid forcing a vast, sprawling array of human activities into 
a Procrustean bed of “speech.” Otherwise, worthwhile initiatives for reform 
may be snuffed out before they can even be tried.
A. Must-Carry Rules
Consider, for instance, Canadian legal scholar Jennifer Chandler’s proposed 
idea of a “right to reach an audience” through dominant search engines.45 She 
has argued that the search engine has an obligation, thanks to its dominant 
position and storage capacities, to index all sites publicly available on the 
web.46 Chandler’s idea looks backwards (at precedents like “must-carry” 
43 Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Data Nationalism, 64 emory l.J. 677 (2015) 
(characterizing this development as positive). 
44 Andrew Blair-Stanek, Intellectual Property Law Solutions to Tax Avoidance, 
62 ucla l. rev. 2 (2015).
45 Jennifer A. Chandler, A Right to Reach an Audience: An Approach to Intermediary 
Bias on the Internet, 35 hoFsTra l. rev. 1095 (2007). The Canadian provenance 
of the proposal is particularly of interest thanks to how many large technology 
platforms are based in the United States. Without some degree of national control 
over international firms, the prospect of digital colonization is a clear and present 
danger. See also Lisa Austin, Technological Tattletales and Constitutional Black 
Holes: Communications Intermediaries and Constitutional Constraints, 17 
TheoreTical inquiries l. 451 (2016).
46 In a series of copyright disputes, Google had argued that it should receive a 
special dispensation from intellectual property laws so that it could provide 
and archive, backup copy, and index the web and the world’s books. Mary 
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rules for cable networks) and could be carried forwards: from a minimalist 
aspect of net neutrality, to a minor “indexing duty” as an aspect of search 
neutrality, to an aspect of app neutrality.47 A presumption of inclusion for 
those running the app stores and software for dominant phones, like Apple 
(or GooglePlay, which services Android Phones), could provide a level 
playing field for unpopular or unprofitable speech while barely affecting the 
functioning of large platforms. 
For deregulationist digerati, the idea of pushing neutrality beyond the 
“pipes” of the internet, to hardware, critical software, dominant search engines, 
social networks, and apps, may seem like an impulse for fairness run amok. 
However, networked technology is often more prone to concentrate power 
than it is to diffuse it, and when such concentrations of power occur, law must 
respond to them.48 Consider the rise of “WeChat” in China, on a “one app to 
rule them all” model.49 It is primarily a messaging and chat app. But as venture 
capitalist Connie Chan observes, “WeChat shows what it’s like to be both a 
platform and a mobile portal.”50 It is easy to book a restaurant reservation, 
or a doctor, all within the app, as these screenshots captured by Chan show: 
Sue Coleman, President of the Univ. of Michigan, Address to the Professional/
Scholarly Publishing Division of the Ass’n of Am. Publishers (Feb. 6, 2006) 
(talking about preservation and Google Books); Mary Sue Coleman, Opinion, 
Riches We Must Share..., wash. PosT, Oct. 22, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/21/AR2005102101451.html. If it deserves 
exemption from copyright laws to pursue that goal, it should also accept some 
obligations tailored to the same aim, pursuant to other forms of regulation.
47 Jonathan Zittrain has observed that an FCC Inquiry may foreshadow app neutrality 
concerns. See Jonathan Zittrain, Net Neutrality: The FCC Takes Back the Ball, 
concurring oPinions (Sept. 7, 2010, 11:02 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.
com/archives/2010/09/net-neutrality-the-fcc-takes-back-the-ball.html (“[M]aybe 
app neutrality would make us worry less about network discrimination, or net 
neutrality could still permit app discrimination.”).
48 alexander galloway, ProTocol (2004); david golumBia, The culTure oF 
comPuTaTion (2009).
49 Connie Chan, When One App Rules Them All: The Case of WeChat and Mobile 
in China, andreessen horowiTz (Aug. 6, 2015), http://a16z.com/2015/08/06/
wechat-china-mobile-first/.
50 Id.
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Chan calls WeChat a “kingmaker” for both content and commerce — 
exactly the characterization Alexander Halavais chose for Google in his 
prescient work Search Engine Society in 2008.51 To the extent that it attracts 
a massive user base to become a dominant intermediary in varied areas of 
content and commerce, it should attract the same scrutiny originally aimed at 
intermediaries in movements for net and search neutrality. And even in the very 
narrow field of “doctor search,” rules are common and largely commendable.52
The fact that a consumer could, in principle, search for doctors or restaurants 
in either WeChat or Google or their insurer’s website, may seem to diminish 
the importance of rules of fair treatment binding on any particular platform. 
But in an age of social acceleration, most users are either not inclined (or 
lack the time) to make a leisurely choice of what app or search engine (or 
other intermediary) will best guide them toward what they want.53 Leading 
platforms reign, and tip into dominance at very rapid speed.54
Platforms may protest, claiming that they should be treated no differently 
than a “brick-and-mortar” retailer like Wal-Mart. Few advocate that it be 
required to stock certain volumes of books, or products. But this misunderstands 
the difference between digital and physical sales. Executives who brag to 
51 alexander halavais, search engine socieTy (2008). 
52 For documentation of regulation here, see Kristin Madison, The Law and 
Policy of Health Care Quality Reporting, 31 camPBell l. rev. 215 (2009); 
Ann Marie Marciarille, ‘How’s My Doctoring?’ Patient Feedback’s Role in 
Assessing Physician Quality, 14 dePaul J. healTh care l. 361 (2012); and 
Frank Pasquale, Reputation Regulation, in The oFFensive inTerneT 107 (Saul 
Levmore & Martha Nussbaum eds., 2010).
53 Social acceleration is impressively documented in several recent sociological 
works. See harTmuT rosa, social acceleraTion: a new Theory oF moderniTy 
(2013); Judy waJcman, Pressed For Time: The acceleraTion oF liFe under 
digiTal caPiTalism (2014). 
54 Pasquale, supra note 1, at 82 (discussing mechanisms of self-reinforcing digital 
dominance).
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shareholders about a “long tail” of endlessly diverse online content can’t turn 
around and tell governmental authorities that they must jealously guard limited 
space.55 For the largest internet-based companies, an app will take up a tiny 
fraction of their overall storage and communications capacity. To the extent 
that the cost is nontrivial, it can be shifted to the app demanding inclusion 
(plus a reasonable rate of return for the dominant app seller to compensate 
for the inconvenience). To make the internet a level playing field, dominant 
companies need to start recognizing the utility-like aspects of their role, and 
to shoulder some burdens (rather than just pocketing the benefits) of serving 
as an infrastructure of free expression.56
The “long tail” aspect of digital megaplatforms neatly reverses the classic 
“abundance” rationale for deregulation. In communications law 1.0, agencies 
invoked “spectrum scarcity” to justify interventions designed to bring some 
order to, say, the airwaves.57 As options like cable and the internet developed, 
a neoliberal reaction questioned the necessity of must-carry rules and the 
fairness doctrine. Media options seemed endless, so why try to make any 
particular one fair or balanced?58
In the second decade of the new millennium, advancing computing capacity 
(and, more importantly, its social organization) has changed the landscape 
again. A sense of near-infinite plenitude inheres not merely in the internet 
as a whole, but also in the web giants constantly investing in the computing 
capacity needed to map large portions of it. When a service has hundreds 
of millions of users, the acceptance of certain rules for it starts to seem less 
55 Chris Anderson, The Long Tail, wired (Oct. 1, 2004, 12:00 PM), http://www.
wired.com/wired/archive/12.10/tail.html.
56 Jack Balkin, The First Amendment Is an Information Policy, 41 hoFsTra l. rev. 
1, 7 (2012) (“[I]ndividual freedoms of speech, press, and assembly require an 
infrastructure of free expression.”).
57 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), as received; cf. Barron, supra 
note 20.
58 John Blevins, Meet the New Scarcity: A First Amendment Framework for Regulating 
Access to the Digital Media Platforms, in selecTed works oF John F. Blevins (2011), 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=john_blevins 
(“[C]ourts should defer to access regulations of uncompetitive network-layer 
platforms such as broadband access infrastructure. Regulations of application-
layer platforms such as search engines, by contrast, should be subjected to higher 
First Amendment scrutiny. . . . [because] different layers of modern digital 
networks have vastly distinct economic and technological characteristics.”). 
Blevins believes that the old “scarcity” rationale behind Red Lion is obsolete, 
because “unique features of the Internet’s architecture make application markets 
(including search engine markets) inherently competitive and contestable.” Id.
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like overbearing state action than a virtual Magna Carta: rulers acceding to 
certain minimum standards of due process and inclusion.59
Must-carry rules in this context are two removes from censorship as 
traditionally conceived. First, they are only adding information to a search 
platform: they are pro-speech. Adding one option does not automatically push 
out others. Second, they amount to an effort by one kind of sovereign to limit 
the power of another to censor. As Jeffrey Rosen observes:
Until recently, the person who had more power to determine who may 
speak and who may be heard around the world was not a president or 
king or Supreme Court Justice. She was Nicole Wong, who was deputy 
general counsel at Google until her recent resignation. Her colleagues 
called her “the Decider” . . . [because of her power] to decide what 
content goes up or comes down [on Google and YouTube throughout 
the world].60
If a few legislatures decide to constrain the censorship power of Silicon 
Valley “deciders” in some ways, that regulation does not necessarily endanger 
freedom of expression.61 
There are many ways that government could encourage more accountable 
intermediaries. The bevy of immunities Congress has granted to information location 
tools via the Digital Millennium Copyright Act62 and Communications Decency Act63 
59 For the national analogy, see generally lori andrews, i know who you are 
and i saw whaT you did (2011) (on the need for a social networking bill of 
rights); reBecca mackinnon, consenT oF The neTworked (2012) (extending 
the “platform as nation” metaphor); and Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 
n.c. l. rev. 1807, 1807 (2012) (“Who rules Facebookistan? Who makes the 
rules that govern the way a tenth of humanity connects on the Internet?”).
60 Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders, 80 Fordham l. rev. 1525, 1536 (2012). 
61 As legal scholar Dawn Nunziato observes, “Google, in its capacity both as 
the dominant Internet search engine and as the operator of its popular news 
aggregation site, has engaged in various acts of censorship.” nunziaTo, supra note 
17, at 12. In her book, Virtual Freedom, Nunziato mentions suspect decisions at 
Google News, Google AdWords, and the search engine generally. For example, 
Google seemed to retaliate against Inner-City Press by dropping the publication 
from Google News after it had questioned Google for failing to sign on to an 
anticensorship commitment known as The Global Compact. Id. at 13.
62 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). See generally Rustad 
& Koenig, supra note 29. 
63 Communications Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (1996) 
(codified as amended at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). See generally Rustad 
& Koenig, supra note 29. 
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might be conditioned on platforms adopting internal processes designed to 
give those entirely de-indexed some right to a fair hearing and explanation 
for the action.64 The critical point is to recognize the malleability of the new 
information infrastructure.
Admittedly, Google has won some lawsuits challenging its placement of 
websites in search results on free expression grounds. In Langdon v. Google,65 
Langdon claimed that Google had a duty to carry his advertisements, which 
charged U.S. bureaucrats with corruption and China with committing atrocities.66 
The district court dismissed the claim.67 For the Langdon court, Google’s 
advertising decisions were tantamount to those made by a newspaper, and 
therefore regulation of them would be as suspect as the “right of reply” at 
issue (and rejected) in Miami Herald v. Tornillo.68 However, the Miami Herald 
was merely one of hundreds of U.S. newspapers at the time of that decision.69 
64 See generally Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (noting that students who 
have suffered a loss or interference with a protected property interest “must be 
given some kind of notice and some kind of hearing”); Henry J. Friendly, Some 
Kind of Hearing, 123 u. Pa. l. rev. 1267 (1975). 
65 Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007).
66 Id. at 626; see also Frank Pasquale, Shaming Search Engines, concurring oPinions 
(Nov. 6, 2007, 4:57 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/11/
shaming_search.html (showing that congressional concern over search engines’ 
complicity in the Chinese government’s campaign against dissent was expressed 
in 2006 with the proposal of the Global Online Freedom Act). See generally 
Chris Langdon, Communist China Has Murdered Millions: Boycott China, 
communisT china is evil, http://soc.culture.irish.narkive.com/mvcyFwgI/for-
paul-the-rabid-rabbit-communist-china-has-murdered-millions-boycott-china 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
67 Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 634-35.
68 Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); see Eric Goldman, “Must Carry” 
Lawsuit Against Search Engines — Langdon v. Google, Tech. & markeTing l. 
Blog (June 8, 2006, 12:46 PM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/06/
must_carry_laws.htm: 
Recall that from Miami Herald v. Tornillo, a statutory must-carry rule applied 
to newspapers violated the constitutional freedom of the press. Given the 
very specific justifications for tighter regulation of broadcasting, and that 
those bases have been held inapplicable to the Internet (see, e.g., Reno v. 
ACLU), I think (for these purposes) that search engines are more appropriately 
analogized to newspapers instead of broadcasters. Accordingly, I can’t see 
how any judge could constitutionally order “must carry” relief here. 
69 Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism, The State of the News Media 2004: 
An Annual Report on American Journalism, Journalism.org (2004), http://www.
stateofthemedia.org/2004/newspapers-intro/audience/ (noting that in 2002 there 
were 1457 U.S. daily newspapers, after decades of consolidation in the industry). 
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Google is a dominant search engine not only in the United States but in 
much of Europe and beyond, and plays a critical role for the inquisitive. To 
the extent that it is a media entity, it is closer to the situation of the firms in 
Red Lion and Turner than it is to the Miami Herald.70 Its reach is far larger 
than that of the newspaper in Miami Herald. Its selection and arrangement 
of links comes far closer to the cable network or broadcaster’s decision about 
what shows to program (where such entities, by and large, do not create the 
content they choose to air), than it does to a newspaper which mostly runs 
its own content and has cultivated an editorial voice (ala the Miami Herald). 
Finally, and most importantly, massive internet platforms must take the bitter 
with the sweet: if they want to continue avoiding liability for intellectual 
property infringement and defamation, they should welcome categorization 
as a conduit for speech, rather than speaker status itself.
B. Antitrust and Competition Law
Google is no stranger to competition regulation. One commentator has 
estimated that the company “officially violated antitrust laws in 10 different 
ways over 5 years.”71 The company’s critics routinely critique its practices 
as anticompetitive.72 As of January 2012, it was under investigation in nine 
countries, the European Union, and some states in the United States.73 But 
70 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
71 Scott Cleland, Google’s Global Antitrust Rap Sheet — Google Now Has Violated 
Antitrust Laws in 10 Different Ways, Precursor Blog (Jan. 31, 2012, 6:42 PM), 
http://precursorblog.com/?q=content/googles-global-antitrust-rap-sheet-google-
now-has-violated-antitrust-laws-10-different-ways; see also Antitrust Regulators 
Raid Google’s Offices in South Korea, BBc news (Sept. 7, 2011, 12:37 AM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14816295. 
72 See Benjamin Edelman, Bias in Search Results?: Diagnosis and Response, 
7 ind. J.l. & Tech. 16, 30 (2011); Joshua Hazan, Stop Being Evil: A Proposal 
for Unbiased Google Search, 111 mich. l. rev. 789 (2013) (“Google’s conduct 
does in fact violate § 2 of the Sherman Act and § 5 of the FTC Act.”); Nathan 
Newman, The Cost of Lost Privacy: Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of 
Control of User Data 1 (Information Law Institute, NYU, Working Paper, 
2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2265026 (“[W]hat 
is largely missed in analyses defending Google from antitrust action is how 
that ever expanding control of user personal data and its critical value to online 
advertisers creates an insurmountable barrier to entry for new competition.”).
73 Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Probes Allegations 
of Antitrust Violations by Google (Nov. 30, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-10-1624_en.htm; Dan Levin, Google Faces Texas AG Inquiry, Settles 
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in early January 2013, Google scored a major victory, as the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) agreed to drop nearly all of the most publicized part 
of its case against the company: allegations of biased and anticompetitive 
behavior in search results. Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch worried that 
Google may have been “telling ‘half-truths’ — for example, that its gathering 
of information about the characteristics of a consumer is done solely for the 
consumer’s benefit, instead of also to maintain a monopoly or near-monopoly 
position.”74 But the majority of the Commission decided unequivocally to end 
the investigation. They publicly justified the decision with little more than 
a page of assurances that FTC interviews and economic analyses had found 
little to no problematic behavior.75
Unmentioned in the decision, but perhaps influencing the result, was Google’s 
would-be “trump card” argument against intervention: a constitutional claim 
that the First Amendment effectively foreclosed any robust remedies, such as 
requirements that Google alter search results to include links to competitors 
of its varied conglomeratized holdings. A Google filing written by Eugene 
Volokh and Donald Falk76 has made the “free expression” case for virtually 
unfettered discretion in the exercise of internet intermediaries’ editorial 
judgment. The stakes of the legal strategy are high. If Google succeeds, 
just about any information age company77 could characterize its selection 
Privacy Suit, reuTers: Tech. (Sept. 3, 2010, 8:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2010/09/03/us-google-settlement-idUSN0312083220100903; Jessica 
Dye, Italy Launches Antitrust Probe of Google News, law 360 (Aug. 27, 2009, 
2:19 PM), http://www.law360.com/corporate/articles/118735/italy-launches-
antitrust-probe-of-google-news.
74 Concurring and Dissenting Statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch Regarding 
Google’s Search Practices, In the Matter of Google Inc., FTC File No. 111-
0163, at 1 n.1 (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
public_statements/concurring-and-dissenting-statement-commissioner-j.thomas-
rosch-regarding-googles-search-practices/130103googlesearchstmt.pdf.
75 Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In 
the Matter of Google Inc., FTC File Number 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2013), https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/295971/130103goog
lesearchstmtofcomm.pdf. The Commission’s statement says: “The totality of 
the evidence indicates that, in the main, Google adopted [changes] improve 
the quality of its search results, and that any negative impact on actual or 
potential competitors was incidental to that purpose.” But the Commission has 
not released details about the nature of that evidence, the types of tests it used, 
or the standards employed in them. 
76 Volokh & Falk, supra note 38, at 883-900. 
77 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Joins Department of Justice and Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau in Filing Brief Supporting the Constitutionality of 
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and coordination of information as “searchy” and thus “speechy” enough to 
avoid regulation.78
Fortunately, neither courts nor regulators must accept a general theory of 
search as speech. It is an effort to impose a “one-size-fits-all” approach on 
multifarious phenomena.79 There is no generalized “free expression” exemption 
from competition laws for communication conduits or media firms — and 
to the extent that search engines mix both functions, they have never given 
an account of why that mixing should lead to even more protection from 
regulation than was enjoyed by the entities whose functions they meld. Indeed, 
there is a strong case for more regulation and watchdogging, since the vertical 
integration of content and conduit (along with horizontal conglomeratization 
accelerated by winner-take-all dynamics online) tends toward the creation of 
ever more powerful firms.80
Even in the United States, the Supreme Court has recognized that enforcement 
of the Sherman Act81 (a foundation of United States competition law), even in 
media contexts, can do as much to advance free expression as to restrict it. For 
example, in Associated Press v. United States, a newspaper association argued 
that it should be immune from certain aspects of competition law because 
of its expressive purpose. The Supreme Court rightly rejected that assertion:
The First Amendment, far from providing an argument against 
application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (May 8, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2012/05/ftc-joins-department-justice-consumer-financial-protection-
bureau.
78 Frank Pasquale, Search, Speech, and Secrecy: Corporate Strategies for Inverting 
Net Neutrality Debates, 29 yale l. & Pol’y rev. inTer alia (May 15, 2010, 
10:15 AM), http://ylpr.yale.edu/inter_alia/search-speech-and-secrecy-corporate-
strategies-inverting-net-neutrality-debates. For articles on the proper limits 
of the First Amendment, see Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First 
Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 harv. 
l. rev. 1765 (2004); and Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment 
Doctrine, 47 sTan. l. rev. 1249 (1995). In Frank Pasquale & Oren Bracha, 
Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness and Accountability in the Law of 
Search, 93 cornell l. rev. 1149, 1188-201 (2008), Oren Bracha and I applied 
their arguments (among others) in the new technological contexts created by 
search engines. 
79 Andrei Broder, A Taxonomy of Web Search, ACM sigir F., Fall 2002, at 3. 
80 ariel ezrachi & maurice e. sTucke, virTual comPeTiTion: The Promise and 
Perils oF The algoriThm-driven economy (2016); maurice sTucke and alan 
grunes, Big daTa and comPeTiTion Policy (2016).
81 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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the contrary. . . . Surely a command that the government itself shall 
not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental 
combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally 
guaranteed freedom. . . . Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the 
Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing 
is not. . . . The First Amendment affords not the slightest support for 
the contention that a combination to restrain trade in news and views 
has any constitutional immunity.82
Admittedly, in the U.S. context, the First Amendment is often seen as a 
protection only from government action, not private initiative. But even U.S. 
courts are under no obligation to blind themselves to their First Amendment 
interpretations’ effects on the general information environment. Virtually 
any government regulation will have direct or incidental impact on some 
entity’s ability to “speak,” and the determination of the line between proper 
and improper regulations, when regulations are challenged on free expression 
grounds, should depend not merely on the interests of the party bringing the 
suit, but on mature consideration of the general effects of the regulation. 
Moreover, even some U.S. case law affirms a positive right to governmental 
intervention against the speech-constraining activity of private parties. U.S. 
courts have consistently held that, “when a crowd or individual threatens 
hostile action in response to a demonstration or speaker,” the First Amendment 
“grants a positive right to the speaker: the local government must take action 
to protect the speaker against a hostile crowd. The courts do not allow local 
law enforcement to accede to a heckler's veto.”83 Though U.S. courts have 
historically been extraordinarily suspicious towards positive rights framings of 
constitutional issues, the clash of private rights so evident in communicative 
contexts has forced them to recognize the importance of positive state action 
to promote truly free expression. This recognition should extend to digital 
contexts. For example, consider the possibility that massive internet platforms 
might secretly bias their news coverage in an election to promote one favored 
candidate. Successful legal action to require the disclosure of this pattern of 
behavior, as an unfair and deceptive trade practice, would improve the public 
sphere, not diminish it. Those who promote “more speech” as the solution 
to problems of media or intermediary bias in the democratic public sphere 
should welcome such disclosure requirements.84
82 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
83 Cheryl A. Leanza, Heckler’s Veto Case Law as a Resource for Democratic 
Discourse, 35 hoFsTra l. rev. 1305, 1305 (2007).
84 Frank Pasquale, Search Neutrality as Disclosure and Auditing, BalkinizaTion (Feb. 19, 
2011), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/02/search-neutrality-as-disclosure-and.html.
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Both hostile crowds and monopolizing corporations can suppress speech. 
Laws guaranteeing public order respond to the first threat; competition law 
can address the second. For example, in Lorain Journal v. United States, 
a newspaper refused to deal with advertisers who advertised on its new 
competitor, a radio station.85 The newspaper claimed that it had an unfettered 
right to choose its advertisers, but the Court disagreed. If business enterprises 
can get their core message across while respecting the intellectual property 
laws, so too should they be able to adequately communicate without trampling 
on the Sherman Act.86 
The applicability of competition law to search engines should be even 
clearer than its applicability to pure media firms. There is a spectrum of 
plausibly “message-sending” entities; consider the range of messages plausibly 
“expressed” by each “author” in the following chart. 
Comparing the Expressiveness of Media and Corporations
More Expressive Less Expressive
Print Newspaper article Chain of 
newspapers
Holding company owning 
several chains of newspapers
Radio Song Chain of radio 
stations
Holding company owning 
several chains of radio 
stations
Television Program Channel Cable network
Were a government to require newspaper articles to express a particular 
point of view, that would be a violation of freedom of expression. Prohibiting 
one firm from owning more than thirty percent of newspaper chains or cable 
networks, though, has far less dire consequences for freedom of expression 
— and may well promote it. Similarly, basic rules about what advertisements 
a media firm must carry do not infringe on its primary function of delivering 
content. Note, too, that the chart above only covers the content and corporate 
organization of entities already recognized as media. To the extent dominant 
search engines, social networks, and other new media simply enable connections 
85 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951):
The publisher claims a right as a private business concern to select its 
customers and to refuse to accept advertisement from whomever it pleases. 
. . . [But the] right claimed by the publisher is neither absolute nor exempt 
from regulation. Its exercise as a purposeful means of monopolizing interstate 
commerce is prohibited by the Sherman Act. 
86 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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between audiences and content, they fall even further on the “less expressive” 
side of the spectrum schematized above.
Governments will continue to grapple with the free expression implications 
of ordering certain results to be included or excluded in search engine results 
pages. As they do so, they should remember that search engines, most of the 
time, share more in common with carriers and conduits than they do with 
media firms.87 Moreover, to the extent that the media analogy is appropriate, 
it is not dispositive, as Turner Broadcasting learned in the context of its ill-
fated facial challenge to “must-carry” regulations, and the Lorain Journal 
and Associated Press learned in the competition law context.
C. Privacy Laws
Once upon a time, it was plausible to strictly distinguish between information 
collection by private firms, and that done by the government. Libertarians in 
particular expressed deep suspicion of the latter, and tended to view the former 
as a form of free inquiry, deserving whatever constitutional protections are 
afforded to speech by human persons. However, scholars have shown that the 
government often uses private databases to gather data it is itself forbidden 
from collecting.88 After the Snowden revelations of pervasive government 
hacking of (or collaboration with) massive technology firms, the stakes of 
so-called “private” information gathering are even clearer. There is no clear 
line between corporate and governmental data gathering. 
The Snowden revelations also suggested another complication of long-
standing theoretical assumptions about the divide between public and private. 
Certain parts of the state, such as the Commission Nationale de l’Informatique 
et des Libertés (CNIL) in France or FTC in the United States, can stop or 
limit data acquisition and transfer. Others, primarily in the security and 
intelligence sectors, urge the expansion and intensification of surveillance. One 
major reason persons fail to speak out or protest is because they are afraid of 
their words coming back to haunt them.89 This fear is not unfounded: recent 
87 Frank Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics 
for Carriers and Search Engines, 2008 u. chi. legal F. 263, 289 (directly 
analogizing the two commercial entities).
88 Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other 
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 
29 n.c. J. inT’l l. & com. reg. 595 (2003); Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s 
Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 caliF. 
l. rev. 901 (2008).
89 neil richards, inTellecTual Privacy: reThinking civil liBerTies in The digiTal 
age (2015); daniel solove, noThing To hide: The False TradeoFF BeTween 
Privacy and securiTy (2011).
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surveillance abuses have uncovered frequent government monitoring of core 
political communication.90 Therefore, some quantum of privacy is a sine qua 
non of free expression rights worth having. The instrumentalities of the state 
that guarantee such privacy are part of the infrastructure of free expression. 
The “private” firms that defy or evade those guardians of privacy are just as 
surely undermining the infrastructure of free expression as the surveillance 
state that has monitored, and will continue to monitor, the data gathered by 
private firms.91 
The integration of state and private surveillance has cast Eugene Volokh’s 
effort to characterize privacy protections as the “troubling right to stop others 
from speaking about you” in a new light.92 Given the rising power of algorithmic 
classifications based on big data, predictive analytics, and machine learning 
programs seamlessly integrating corporate and state information, threats 
to personal reputation or liberty appear less as speech than as menacing 
classifications. “Relational surveillance,” based not only on state-gathered 
data but also the observations of a private apparatus far more invasive and 
intrusive, may run afoul not merely of the Fourth Amendment, but also of the 
First Amendment.93 To the extent that privacy laws require data deletion or 
compartmentalization that frustrates such surveillance, they are likely to do as 
90 Frank Pasquale, We Must Confront the Recent Surveillance Abuses to Develop 
Better Policy Moving Forward, lse Blog (Jan. 23, 2014), http://blogs.lse.
ac.uk/usappblog/2014/01/23/we-must-confront-the-recent-surveillance-abuses-
to-develop-better-policy-moving-forward/.
91 Bernard Harcourt, Law and Digital Ascesis, concurring oPinions (Mar. 17, 
2016), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2016/03/law-and-digital-ascesis.
html; Frank Pasquale, A Social Theory of Surveillance, concurring oPinions 
(Mar. 15, 2016), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2016/03/a-social-
theory-of-surveillance.html. 
92 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling 
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 sTan. l. 
rev. 1049, 1051 (2000). Neil Richards has dissected the flaws in Volokh’s 
Lochneresque effort to reduce the complex societal dynamics of fair data practices 
to Hohfeldian trump cards held by individuals and corporations. See Neil M. 
Richards, Reconciling Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 ucla l. rev. 
1149, 1150 (2005). 
93 Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First 
Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.c. l. rev. 741 (2008): 
Despite the rising importance of digitally mediated association, current 
Fourth Amendment and statutory schemes provide only weak checks on 
government. The potential to chill association through overreaching relational 
surveillance is great. . . . [T]he First Amendment’s freedom of association 
guarantees can and do provide a proper framework for regulating relational 
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much to support fundamental values of free expression of persons, as they are 
to undermine the rights of corporations as researchers or archivists of data.94
Individuals’ ability to learn more about the world is also enabled by targeted 
restrictions on the collection and sharing of information by large firms. A 
person might hesitate to join a mental illness support group on Facebook, 
once she is aware that a data miner might later use the data generated by that 
membership in myriad, unforeseeable contexts. State restrictions on the sale 
of such data enable her rights of free association and inquiry, even if they 
come at the expense of asserted corporate prerogatives to perfectly “know” 
potential customers, and speak about and to them. Rather than framing the 
issue as one of privacy versus free expression, it is more proper to see this 
as a dispute over rival claims of free expression — where privacy interests 
weigh heavily on one side. 
The technological tools for matching digital records are staggering. State 
restrictions on the use of that data (or other forms of tracking) can be an 
important step toward giving individuals a chance to form and express opinions 
and affiliations in peace — without fearing an endlessly ramifying series of 
classifications made and opportunities possibly denied, on account of faceless 
and secretive data miners. One legal expert recently warned that employers 
“may develop complex scoring algorithms based on electronic health records to 
determine which individuals are likely to be high-risk and high-cost workers.”95 
surveillance and suggests how these guarantees might apply to particular 
forms of analysis of traffic data. 
94 As Danielle Citron and I have documented, this kind of surveillance has already 
had troubling chilling effects for political groups on both left and right. Danielle 
Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic 
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 hasTings l.J. 1441, 1459-60 (2011). Dan Solove 
has also argued convincingly that “there are doctrinal, historical, and normative 
justifications for developing” First Amendment-based limits on the “countless 
searches and seizures involving people’s private papers, the books they read, 
the websites they surf, and the pen names they use when writing anonymously.” 
Daniel Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 n.y.u. l. 
rev. 112, 112 (2007). Marc Jonathan Blitz has explored the intersection of free 
speech and privacy values in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), a case 
that guaranteed First Amendment protection for obscene materials “when read 
or viewed by a person in her own home.” See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Stanley in 
Cyberspace: Why the Privacy Protection of the First Amendment Should Be More 
Like That of the Fourth, 62 hasTings l.J. 357, 359 (2010). Paul Schwartz paved 
the way for much of this work in Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in 
Cyberspace, 52 vand. l. rev. 1607 (1999).
95 Sharona Hoffman, Employing E-Health: The Impact of Electronic Health Records 
on the Workplace, 19 kan. J.l. & PuB. Pol’y 409, 422 (2010). Roland Behm 
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The state has a strong interest in delaying the dawn of a brave new world of 
secret characterizations until far more robust infrastructures ensuring data 
accuracy and accountability are developed. Such restrictions are meant just 
as much to enable and empower the speech of citizens, as they are to restrict 
information flows among corporate actors (and the punitive or security arms 
of the state that rely on their data gathering).96
III. conclusIon: toward a socIal tHeory of free 
exPressIon In an era of Platform caPItalIsm
At a 2012 Diane von Furstenburg fashion show, models wore “Google Glasses” 
as they walked down the runway, filming the audience that observed them. 
The glasses contained not only a tiny camera, but also a screen that could 
project information for their wearers, like a crawl at the bottom of a cable 
news program. Synced to face-recognition technology, the glasses might give 
details on the name, profession, awards, net worth, and criminal record of any 
face in the crowd. The “faceprint” is the new fingerprint. The “augmented 
reality” devices promised to make their wearers “laser focused, walking 
encyclopedias.”97 Media outlets lapped up the story, titillated by yet another 
facet of science fiction about to become commercial fact.
Far less salient in their eyes were the concerns raised by a 2005 honors 
thesis, Through the Google Goggles: Sociopolitical Bias in Search Engine 
Design, by Alejandro M. Diaz.98 Diaz described how “designs for search 
has also documented the intrusion of mental health-driven characterizations 
into job applicant scoring used by major corporations. Roland Behm, What Are 
the Issues?, emPloymenT TesTing: Failing To make The grade (July 20, 2013), 
http://employmentassessment.blogspot.com/2013/07/what-are-issues.html.
96 For an account of the interconnections between one such firm and the U.S. 
surveillance apparatus, see Julian assange, when google meT wikileaks 
(2014). 
97 naThan shedroFF & chrisToPher noessel, make iT so: inTeracTion design 
lessons From science FicTion 176 (2012). But see Elise Ackerman, Why Smart 
Glasses Might Not Make You Smarter: A Q&A with Wearable-Computer Pioneer 
Steve Mann, ieee: sPecTrum (Dec. 31 2012), http://spectrum.ieee.org/consumer-
electronics/gadgets/why-smart-glasses-might-not-make-you-smarter.
98 Alejandro Diaz, Through The Google Goggles: Sociopolitical Bias in Search 
Engine Design (May 2005) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Stanford University 
Program on Science, Technology & Society); see also Alejandro M. Diaz, 
Through the Google Goggles: Sociopolitical Bias in Search Engine Design, in 
weB search 11 (Amanda Spink & Michael Zimmer eds., 2008).
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technologies encode certain values about what sort of content is ‘important,’ 
‘relevant,’ or ‘authoritative,’” and chronicled case after case where Google’s 
decisions implicated such values. Even as early as 1999, a growing literature 
was questioning the political and ethical values underlying the search systems 
that were then beginning to make sense of the internet. Diaz’s evocative 
metaphor, “Google Goggles,” suggests that the firm’s glasses, like its search 
engines, may not only “augment” reality, but also distort it, bias it, render it in 
certain preapproved corporate directions, and blind users to more critical takes. 
When massive platforms combine the functions of conduits, content 
providers, and data brokers, analogies from old free expression cases quickly 
fall apart. Too many discussions of the expressive dimensions of new media 
are nevertheless moored in murky doctrinal categories, reifications, and inapt 
historical analogies that do more to obscure than reveal the true stakes of 
disputes. It is time to think beyond the old categories and to develop a new 
way of balancing dominant platforms’ rights and responsibilities. Sometimes, 
that will require the translation of old principles of media regulation (like 
rules against stealth marketing) to new contexts. In other cases, litigation 
will be needed to stop dominant platforms from abusing their power online. 
Platforms should also acknowledge their de facto role as public forums and 
quasi-judicial law interpreters, even if they resist taking on all the de jure 
responsibilities such roles imply for state actors. 
Unfortunately, the frequent invocation of “free expression” now appears 
to be little more than a facet of Silicon Valley public relations.99 Companies 
like Twitter and Facebook are quick to take the credit when their platforms 
are part of movements, but trivialize user rights in their own governance. It 
is almost as if the platforms see themselves as virtual worlds, whose users 
have essentially accepted (via terms of service) near-absolute sovereignty 
of corporate rulers.100
At their best, platforms recognize that such sovereignty comes with 
responsibilities as well as rights. The power to rank is the power to make 
certain public impressions permanent, and others fleeting. As platforms gain 
commercial, political, and cultural influence, their “often opaque technology 
99 kaTherine losse, The Boy kings: a Journey inTo The hearT oF The social 
neTwork (2012).
100 James Grimmelmann, Virtual World Feudalism, 118 yale l.J. PockeT ParT 126, 
128 (2009) (arguing that in the digital feudalism of virtual worlds, the software 
developer “is both the grantor who makes the grant and the law which protects 
it”) (quoting s.F.c. milsom, hisTorical FoundaTions oF The common law 104 
(1st ed. 1969)).
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of ranking becomes kingmaker in new venues.”101 The question now is 
whether the state (and companies themselves) will make these processes 
more comprehensible, fair, transparent, and open to critical analysis by the 
publics they affect. 
101 halavais, supra note 51, at 85. 

